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Caen had been an important accomplishment, but much work remained
to be done. On 18 July, the Canadian portion of Operation Goodwood, Operation
Atlantic, began. It was the first stage in the breakout from the Normandy
beachhead area. According to the plan, the 2nd Canadian Corps, with the British
7th British Armoured and the Guards Armoured Divisions under command, was
to take the suburbs southeast of Caen. Once again, a strong German defence
made this objective difficult to attain. The Canadians suffered heavy losses.
The battle for Verrières Ridge provided a similar story. The Canadians,
participating in Operation Spring, were to attack Verrières, a tactically
important high point that controlled the road south of Caen. On 20 July, and
again four days later, Canadian and British forces failed to take the ridge.
Although they accomplished one of their goals-tying down German Panzer divisions
and thus helping the Americans break out from their positions farther west-Verrières
was a killing ground. (1) The 24 July
engagement was particularly bloody. The North Nova Scotia Highlanders (3rd
Division) ended the engagement with some 100 survivors. The Black Watch regiment
from Montreal was decimated: only 15 survived. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
lost 200 men. On 23 July, as the battles of Operations Atlantic and Spring
were winding down, Headquarters 1st Canadian Army was activated. Initially,
it took under command only the 2nd British Corps, which remained part of 1st
Canadian Army until March 1945. At this point, the "D-Day Dodgers,"
1st Canadian Corps, transferred from Italy to northwest Europe. The 4th Canadian
Armoured Division, the last of Canada's invasion forces, joined 2nd Canadian
Corps in the last days of July, taking the place of the 3rd Canadian Division,
which had faced the Germans for 55 days straight. At the same time, 2nd Canadian
Corps and the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade came under 1st Canadian Army.
The 1st Canadian Army, commanded by General Harry Crerar, was a uniquely international
formation that variously included, in addition to Canadians, British, Polish,
Dutch, Belgian, and Czech formations.
The Nazis, wracked by rash military decision making at the highest
level, now attempted one last gambit; Hitler directed an offensive against
the US 1st Army at Mortain and Avranches. The attack was fraught with peril.
If the German objectives were not taken immediately, both flanks of the attacking
force would become prone to counterattack. The likely result would be encirclement.
The offensive was, in fact, doomed from the start. Thanks to Ultra, Britain's
top secret decoding unit, the Allies had broken the German codes and thus
knew about the plan from the outset. For the Allies, by contrast, the German
offensive was a huge opportunity. Allied armies could spring a trap at the
rear of the advance and cut off a large segment of Germany's fighting force.
The enemy might be crippled, ending the war.
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Battle hardened and increasingly weary, the Canadians
next saw action during the advance to Falaise and beyond. The fighting
was savagely intense. The 1st Canadian Army-which had also incorporated
the 7th British Armoured Division and the 1st Polish Armoured Division-came
under the command of General H.D. Crerar. Its goal was to reach Falaise
and thereby help close a gap into which thousands of Germans were retreating
from the north. On the night of 7 August, the new operation, Totalize,
commenced. Although some striking tactical innovations were introduced,
they could not overcome the inexperience of the Canadian and Polish
armoured divisions fighting their first battles. (2)
While the Canadians achieved some of
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Copyright Canadian War Museum (CN 79068).
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Lieutenant-General H.D.G.
Crerar, by Edith Elizabeth Harrison.
Crerar became the commander of the
newly reorganized 1st Canadian Army that saw its initial action
around Falaise, France in August 1944.
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their tactical aims, by 9 August, they were still far
to the north of Falaise. On 14 August, Guy Simonds's 2nd Canadian Corps
launched Operation Tractable, another major offensive in an attempt
to meet up with American forces advancing from the south and close the
Falaise Pocket. Initially repulsed, it redoubled its efforts on 16 August,
this time with 2nd Canadian Division also committed to the attack. The
next day, Falaise finally fell. In coordination with the Americans,
who began to attack, belatedly, from Argentan in the south on the 18th,
the 1st Canadian Army proceeded to close the gap. When the troops of
the Polish Armoured Division linked up with the Americans at Chambois
on late 20 August, the Allies finally shut the gate on the Falaise Pocket.
The next day, the gate was locked definitively when tanks of the Canadian
Grenadier Guards, 4th Canadian Armoured Division, linked up with the
Poles at Chambois. A measure of the ferocity of the fighting is that
the forward elements of both the Canadian and Polish armoured divisions
were cut off for up to three days. One such Canadian unit was The South
Alberta Regiment. Major David Currie, commanding the tanks of "C"
Squadron and an all too small party of infantrymen
of the Argyl and Sutherland Highlanders, was awarded the Victoria Cross
for his part in seizing and holding St. Lambert, a key site in the line
of the German retreat. Throughout the intense struggle for control of
the Falaise Pocket, the Allied air forces were wreaking horrendous destruction
on the Germans inside. While thousands of Germans were able to slip
out of the trap, almost no tanks or vehicles survived. The Allies managed
to capture almost one half of the Wehrmacht and its equipment then in
Normandy. Thus ended the battle for Normandy, the definitive battle
of the Western Front.
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(1) The aims of the battles around
Caen have been a source of continuing controversy. General Montgomery,
still in command of all land forces in Normandy, both US and British,
always maintained that the primary aim of these battles was to draw
all the German armoured forces against the Anglo-Canadian forces in
the Caen area to allow a breakout by the Americans to the west. General
Eisenhower, still in England, did not understand this point and criticized
the failure to achieve a breakout in the Caen area. The German after-action
assessment seems to support Montgomery and, by this criterion, the operations
were an unqualified success. C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign: The
Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1960), pp. 176-180.
(2) Allied armoured units have
often been accused of being overcautious in the Normandy campaign, but
this criticism is unjustified. In addition to having to learn the art
of war during the campaign, the units possessed a main battle tank that
was seriously outgunned and underarmoured in comparision with the German
tanks. The Sherman tank was equipped with a short-barrelled, medium-velocity
75mm gun. They faced tanks, like the Panther, with long-barrelled, high-velocity
75mm gun and the Tiger with the famous 88mm high-velocity gun. The British
and Canadian armoured regiments were equipped with the Sherman Firefly,
which had a 17-pounder 76.2mm gun that could outgun all but the Tiger.
But they only had one Firefly for every troop of four tanks, and the
Germans quickly learned to knock out the Firefly. Once the Firefly was
destroyed, the rest of the tanks were sitting ducks. Moreover, the Firefly
was not a difficult weapon to disable. Indeed, Allied tank crews named
them "Ronsons" (a brand of lighters) for the ease with which
they caught fire.
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